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ABSTRACT ———————————————————————————————————-
It is well known that movements in lending rates are asymmetric; they rise quickly and
sharply, but fall slowly and gradually. Not known is the fact that the asymmetry is stronger
the less developed a country’s ﬁnancial system is. This new fact is here documented and ex-
plained in a model with an endogenous ﬂow of information about economic conditions. The
stronger asymmetry in less developed countries stems from their greater ﬁnancial system fric-
tions, such as monitoring and bankruptcy costs, which ﬁrst magnify jumps of lending rates
and then delay their recoveries by restricting the generation of information after the crisis. A
quantitative exploration of the model shows the data are consistent with this explanation.
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Asymmetry in the movement of lending rates is well known. They tend to rise quickly and
sharply during crises, but fall slowly and gradually during recoveries. This pattern, which
has been observed in most of the recent ﬁnancial crises,1 has important real consequences
since it generates ﬁnancial distresses and an inefﬁcient reallocation of resources out of pro-
ductive opportunities during the time period lending rates delay to recover.2 Many studies
have offered explanations for this asymmetry,3 but no one has yet examined related features
systematically across countries. I do that here and discover a new fact: the asymmetry in
the movements of lending rates is stronger the less developed a country’s ﬁnancial system
is. More speciﬁcally, I show this stronger asymmetry in less ﬁnancially developed countries
stems from their greater ﬁnancial system frictions, such as monitoring and bankruptcy costs.
I propose an explanation for this new fact based on the informational effects of ﬁnancial fric-
tions. To do this I take Veldkamp’s (2005) endogenous information model, which delivers
asymmetry of lending rates movements, and introduce ﬁnancial frictions to show how they
increase asymmetry.
In the model entrepreneurs can only start a venture by borrowing. Whether they borrow or
not depends on applicable lending rates, which are decided by lenders based on their expec-
tation of being in good times, where probabilities ventures fail and entrepreneurs default are
low. This expectation is constructed using signals from previous ventures’ results: the less
the number of ventures that failed, the more likely the economy is in good times. In a setting
without ﬁnancial frictions, whether a venture succeeds or fails is perfectly observed. When
lenders think the state is good, they charge low rates, there is a lot of borrowing and hence a
large sample of observations. When the state changes to bad, all these signals allow lenders
to easily deduce that conditions have changed and they raise rates quickly to account for the
higher default probability. Contrarily, since in bad times borrowing is low, when the state
1During 1994, Mexican lending rates took just 4 months to rise 70 percentage points, but more than 30 months
to return to their pre-crisis levels. In October 1997, Brazilian real lending rates rose from 71% to 98%, and they
took 10 months to return to pre-crisis levels. In Indonesia, the 8 months following the Asian crisis experienced
a rise in real lending rates from 18% to 35%, and they took 24 months to return to pre-crisis levels. During the
ﬁrst half of 1998, Russian real lending rates rose from 24% to 48%, and they took 25 months to return to pre-crisis
levels.
2See, for example, Bergoeing, Loayza, and Repetto (2004).
3Veldkamp (2005) uses a model of endogenous ﬂow of information to explain the unconditional asymmetry
on lending rates movements. The bulk of the literature has focused on explanations for asymmetry in stock
markets. Banerjee (1992), Welch (1992) and Banerjee and Newman (1993) explain crashes as the result of herd
behavior and information cascades. Jacklin, Kleidon, and Pﬂeiderer (1992), based on Glosten and Milgrom (1985),
use a portfolio insurance model of stock market crashes. Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) use an information-based
model of bubbles. Zeira (1994, 1999) proposes models of informational overshooting to explain booms and crashes
in stock prices. For a review of asymmetries in real economic variables, see Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp
(2006) and Jovanovic (2006).
1changes to good, the limited number of existing ventures offers few signals about the switch,
lenders learn about it slowly and reduce rates gradually. This endogenous learning is what
generates asymmetry in movements of lending rates.
To study the effect of ﬁnancial development on asymmetry, I assume only borrowers know
the result of a venture while lenders can only observe it at a positive cost. The asymmet-
ric information introduces incentives for borrowers to renege from their loans, reporting the
failure of successful ventures. The monitoring and bankruptcy costs lenders have to incur to
motivate truth telling by borrowers constitute a measure of the degree of ﬁnancial frictions
in the system. These costs have two effects in lending rates movements when compared to
the setting without ﬁnancial frictions. First, since monitoring and bankruptcy are more fre-
quent during bad times, when the economy leaves good times, lenders include these higher
expected costs in the lending rates, magnifying their jump. Second, the higher lending rates
in bad times reduce investment and the number of available signals, slowing down the learn-
ing that fuels recoveries when the economy returns to good times. These two effects generate
faster, sharper jumps and slower, gradual drops in lending rates, hence more asymmetry
when compared to an economy without ﬁnancial frictions.
Numerical tests of the model show my explanation is not only qualitatively but also quanti-
tatively consistent with the new fact. First, by simulating a calibrated version of the model
I show that reasonable levels of monitoring and bankruptcy costs predict the differences of
asymmetry observed across countries. Second, I show that one of the model’s main predic-
tions – countries with less-developed ﬁnancial systems face higher levels of lending spreads–
is also both qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the data. Finally, using data from
the United States, I show the plausibility of an endogenous information mechanism to explain
the asymmetry in lending rates movements and its potential to create inefﬁciencies.
Overall, therefore, my study is an empirical (Section 2), theoretical (Section 3), and quantita-
tive (Section 4) investigation of the effects of ﬁnancial frictions on the asymmetry of move-
ments in lending rates.
2 A New Fact: Movements in Lending Rates Are More Asymmetric
in Countries with Less-Developed Financial Systems
I begin my study with an empirical investigation into the asymmetry of movements in real
lending rates across countries with different levels of development in their ﬁnancial systems.
I demonstrate here that robust to many measures of ﬁnancial development, I get the same
result: a stronger degree of asymmetry in real lending rates movements among countries
2with less-developed ﬁnancial systems. This is what I am calling the new fact throughout the
rest of the paper.
I measure the asymmetry of movements in lending rates for each country by constructing the


















where T is the number of observations (number of months in the sample), xt = ln(ρt) −
ln(ρt−1), ρt is the real lending rate in period t and x is the sample mean of the time series. If
lending rates in a country are more likely to experience large jumps rather than large reduc-
tions of the same magnitude, the skewness of their log changes is positive. Furthermore, a
stronger asymmetry is captured by a higher positive skewness.
I compute skewness using International Monetary Fund (IMF) monthly data on real lending
rates from 1960 to 2008, for 100 countries.4 All the countries I select fulﬁll two minimum
requirements: Theirdatahavemorethan48observations(4years)andshowadeﬁnedcyclical
pattern. A list of all countries in the sample, their individual levels of skewness, and their
classiﬁcations is in Appendix A.1.
2.1 General Measures of Financial Development
I start analyzing the relation between lending rates skewness and ﬁnancial development by
using standard and general measures of ﬁnancial development. First, for each country, I
use the sample average of its credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database . As shown in Table 1, just
regressing these two variables for different period samples (1960-1985 and 1985-2008)5 and
different country samples (all countries and non-African countries)6 produces a statistically
4I use data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) to obtain real lending rates by subtracting the
Hodrick-Prescott trend of inﬂation (IFS ﬁgure 64P..ZF...) from nominal lending rates (IFS ﬁgure 60P..ZF...). Two
caveats are relevant. First, I choose the H-P ﬁlter to deﬂate nominal rates in order to capture both backward and
forward looking components in the formation of inﬂation expectations. The alternative use of ex-post real lending
rates (using current inﬂation as a deﬂator) delivers similar results, but has the disadvantage of losing informative
months with large unexpected inﬂation shocks when computing log changes. Second, even when the deﬁnition
of lending rates is not exactly the same across countries, in all of them they represent ”the bank rate that usually
meets the short- and medium- term ﬁnancing needs of the private sector.” It is unlikely though that differences in
this deﬁnition bias the measure of skewness, which is based on changes over time for a given country.
5Results naturally hold for the whole sample 1960-2008 as well.
6Since many African countries have high skewness levels, I restrict the sample in this particular way to conﬁrm
the relation is not just driven by African ﬁxed effects.
3Table 1: Asymmetry of Lending Rates and Financial Development
Dependent Variable All Countries Non-African Countries
Lending rate skewness 1960 – 1985 1985 – 2008 1960 – 1985 1985 – 2008
Credit to Private Sector / GDP −0.036 −0.023 −0.043 −0.017
(0.014)∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.017)∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗
Constant 4.86 2.66 5.36 2.14
(0.72)∗∗∗ (0.42)∗∗∗ (1.07)∗∗∗ (0.48)∗∗∗
Observations 47 94 31 70
Notes: * Signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, and *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. The dependent variable is the skewness measured over the distribution of log changes in monthly
lending rates, obtained from the IMF’s IFS database. Yearly data on the credit to private sector as a percentage of
GDP from the World Bank’s WDI database. The simple average per country over the period sample is considered.
signiﬁcant negative relationship in all cases. These results remain when controlling by the
volatility of GDP per capita, the volatility of lending rates, and the average inﬂation.
Second, I classify countries into groups strongly correlated with ﬁnancial development (see
Levine (1997)) and compute the average lending rate skewness for each group. I classify
countries by four development-related characteristics:
• Level of domestic income per capita. I use the World Bank’s WDI classiﬁcation, where
the richest countries belong to group 1 and the poorest countries belong to group 4.
• Membership or not to the OECD.
• Level of contract enforcement. I classify countries between those with low and high
contract enforcement using the contract enforcement indicator of Levine, Loayza, and
Beck (2000), which is an average between rule of law (an assessment of the law and
order tradition of the country) and government risk (an assessment of the risk that the
government will modify a contract after it has been signed) from La Porta et al. (1998).
In both cases, the indices go from 1 (the lowest possible level) to 10 (the highest possible
level). I use 5 as the relevant cutoff to separate countries evenly between the two groups.
• Availability of information in the ﬁnancial system. I classify countries between those
with and without a private bureau, deﬁned by Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007)
as a private commercial ﬁrm or nonproﬁt organization that maintains a database on the
standing of borrowers in the ﬁnancial system and facilitates the exchange of information
among banks and ﬁnancial institutions.7
7Similar results hold when using the existence of either public or private bureau from Djankov et al. (2008).
4Table 2: Average Asymmetry of Lending Rates by Country Classiﬁcation
Country Classiﬁcation 1960 – 1985 1985 – 2008 1960 – 2008
Income group 1 (richest) 2.71 0.28 1.54
Income group 2 3.17 1.55 1.72
Income group 3 4.22 1.77 2.08
Income group 4 (poorest) 4.87 2.91 3.33
OECD 2.48 0.87 1.75
Non-OECD 4.36 1.98 2.46
High contract enforcement 2.11 0.45 1.36
Low contract enforcement 4.17 2.44 2.92
Private bureau 2.03 0.87 1.40
No private bureau 5.16 2.25 2.66
Notes: Income classiﬁcations from the World Bank (WDI). Contract enforcement indicator from Levine,
Loayza, and Beck (2000). Existence of a private bureau from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). Asymme-
try by group is the simple average of the skewness of member countries for the considered period.
In Table 2, I show simple averages of skewness across countries belonging to each group for
the whole sample and also for two subperiods.8 Richer countries, OECD countries, and coun-
tries with good contract enforcement and information ﬂows show on average less asymmetry
than their counterparts (poorer countries, non-OECD countries, and countries with bad con-
tract enforcement and information ﬂows). This evidence reinforces the initial conclusion of a
negative relation between asymmetry of changes in lending rates and ﬁnancial development.
The table is also informative about asymmetry differences across countries. Since skewness
numbers are difﬁcult to interpret, I translate them as the number of months lending rates take
to recover after a single one-month 10% jump, assuming the rate of decrease is constant in
those months. The skewness corresponding to the ﬁrst two income groups (1.54 and 1.72), for
example, represents recoveries that take 2 or 3 months; in the third group recoveries take 6
months; and in the poorest group recoveries take 15 months.
2.2 Speciﬁc Measures of Financial Development: Financial Frictions
Now I study the relation between lending rates skewness and ﬁnancial development by using
more speciﬁc measures of ﬁnancial development, in particular those related to ﬁnancial fric-
tions such as monitoring and bankruptcy costs. I perform this analysis both across countries
and over time for a given country.
8In Appendix A.3, I repeat this exercise following two alternative approaches to measure skewness. In the ﬁrst
approach, I obtain skewness in log deviations from trend rather than in log changes. In the second approach, I
obtain skewness in log changes of lending spreads with respect to 3-month Treasury bills (a standard measure of
the risk-free interest rate) rather than levels. Results for both cases are consistent with those in Table 2.
52.2.1 Financial frictions across countries
Comparable data on monitoring and bankruptcy costs across countries are not available. In
fact, even estimations of these costs for the United States are subjects of a great controversy
(Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)). As an alternative I use two datasets as proxies. One is based
on the work of Djankov et al. (2008),9 who approximate bankruptcy costs by surveying in-
solvency practitioners about the monetary and time costs of closing businesses in different
countries. The other dataset is based on the work of Porter et al. (1999), who study how costly
it is to monitor borrowers by analyzing the performance of ﬁnancial and banking systems in
improving information access and quality.
a) Bankruptcy costs (Djankov et al. (2008))10
• Cost of bankruptcy: The total cost of a bankruptcy proceeding (in percentage of the
estate value), which includes court/bankruptcy authorities costs, attorney fees, bank-
ruptcy administrator fees, notiﬁcation and publication fees, asset storage and preserva-
tion costs, auctioneer fees, government levies and other associated insolvency costs.
• Time for bankruptcy: The number of years required on average to complete a bank-
ruptcy proceeding.
• Recovery rate: A measure of foreclosure efﬁciency. The recovery rate shows how many
cents on the dollar claimants (creditors, tax authorities, and employees) recover from
an insolvent ﬁrm. The calculation takes into account whether the business is kept as a
goingconcernduringtheproceeding, thediscountedvalueduetothetimespentclosing
down, court costs, attorneys, and so on.
Table 3 shows the results of simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions between lending
rates skewness and these measures. The positive relationship between bankruptcy costs and
asymmetry (as seen in positive coefﬁcients for cost and time of bankruptcy and negative for
recovery rate of claimants) is statistically signiﬁcant in all cases. Since Djankov et al. (2008)
variables are measured for 2004, I also report results restricting the sample to 1985 – 2008.
The coefﬁcients are basically the same and conﬁrm the robustness of our results: lending
rates movements in less ﬁnancially developed countries are more asymmetric.
9When information was not available from Djankov et al. (2008), I completed it with data from Doing Business,
Djankov et al. (2005).
10It is worth mentioning Djankov et al. (2008) constructed this dataset based on multiple-choice surveys to
insolvency practitioners in different countries, not by a direct measure of bankruptcy costs.
6Table 3: Asymmetry of Lending Rates and Bankruptcy Costs
Dependent Variable 1960 – 2008 1985 – 2008
Lending Rate Skewness
Cost of bankruptcy 0.037 0.044
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗
Time for bankruptcy 0.221 0.210
(0.100)∗∗ (0.116)∗
Recovery rate −0.014 −0.019
(0.007)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗
Constant 1.265 1.252 2.356 0.668 0.806 2.047
(0.322)∗∗∗ (0.347)∗∗∗ (0.398)∗∗∗ (0.294)∗∗ (0.382)∗∗ (0.407)∗∗∗
Observations 85 85 85 85 85 85
Notes: * Signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, and *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. All independent variables are from Djankov et al. (2008) and Djankov et al. (2005).
b) Monitoring costs (Porter et al. (1999))
• Legal protection for ﬁnancial assets
• Sophistication of ﬁnancial markets
• Availability of Internet banking
• Health of banking systems
These monitoring costs variables are measured by an index that ranges from 1 to 7 (from the
worst to the best). Table 4 shows the results of running simple OLS regressions of skewness
on these variables: negative and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients in all cases. The general
conclusion is, again, that a more difﬁcult ﬂow of information in a ﬁnancial system, and hence
more ﬁnancial frictions and less ﬁnancial development, increases the asymmetry of move-
ments in lending rates. By space considerations I report the regressions only for the more
recent period 1985 – 2008 (the study Porter et al. (1999) is more relevant for the latest years).
The regression results for the full sample 1960 – 2008 are almost identical.
2.2.2 Financial frictions over time
Given the high correlation across countries between the development of the ﬁnancial system
and the development in other sectors of the economy, more asymmetry in lending rates move-
ments may be related to less development in those other sectors. An alternative way to test
7Table 4: Asymmetry of Lending Rates and Monitoring Costs
Dependent Variable 1985 – 2008
Lending Rate Skewness
Legal protection to ﬁnancial assets −0.71
(0.24)∗∗∗
Sophistication of ﬁnancial markets −0.62
(0.19)∗∗∗
Availability of Internet banking −0.57
(0.24)∗∗
Health of banking systems −0.56
(0.16)∗∗∗
Constant 4.55 3.61 3.43 3.82
(1.40)∗∗∗ (0.98)∗∗∗ (1.21)∗∗∗ (0.98)∗∗∗
Observations 56 56 56 56
Notes: * Signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, and *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. All independent variables were obtained from surveys conducted by Porter et al. (1999).
the importance of the ﬁnancial development in the reduction of asymmetry is to analyze the
evolution of lending rates skewness in a given country over time.
First, technology improvements are closely related to ﬁnancial system developments, since
ﬁnancial frictions are based on the efﬁciency of auditing accounts and on the ease of sharing
and transmitting information. That is, the better the available technology (such as comput-
ers and telecommunications) is in a country, the lower the monitoring and bankruptcy costs
within its ﬁnancial sector (Merton (1987)). Information technologies have improved signiﬁ-
cantly and continuously from 1960 on. Table 2 shows that, for all classiﬁcation groups, asym-
metry in lending rates decreases over time, maintaining the ranking among them. A plausible
interpretation is that technological improvements reduce ﬁnancial frictions and asymmetry
over time in all countries.
Second, we compare skewness in a given country before and after a ﬁnancial liberalization
process. This process is a shock that abruptly reduces monitoring and bankruptcy costs, and
in general ﬁnancial frictions, by opening the system to competition and by inducing the adop-
tion of modern and more efﬁcient practices, a better enforcement of contracts, and easier ﬂow
of information. This test, too, supports the new fact of negative relation between asymmetry
and ﬁnancial development.
Data on ﬁnancial liberalization are obtained from Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) for the
period 1973 – 2005. Their work includes information on liberalization along three dimen-
sions: capital accounts, domestic ﬁnancial sectors, and stock market capitalization. Capital
8account liberalization refers to an increased ability of corporations to borrow abroad and
fewer controls on exchange rate mechanisms and other sorts of capital. Domestic ﬁnancial
liberalization refers to a loosening of interest rate controls (lending and deposits) and other
restrictions, such as directed credit policies or limitations on foreign currency deposits. Stock
market liberalization refers to an increase in the degree to which foreigners are allowed to
own domestic equity and a decrease in restrictions to repatriate capital, dividends, and in-
terests. I focus on 16 countries for which I have enough data to reliably measure skewness
before and after major liberalization events (more than 47 observations on each side).
Table 5 shows a comparison of lending rates skewness for each country before and after its
main ﬁnancial liberalization event.11 For all the countries, except Ireland, lending rate skew-
ness raised after their main liberalization event. Table 6 shows a comparison of skewness for
each country before and after its whole ﬁnancial liberalization process, while Table 7 shows
the same comparison before and after a ﬁnancial restriction process.12 Of the 16 countries,
only Korea did not experience a reduction in skewness after liberalization. In contrast, the
three countries that restricted the ﬁnancial system experienced an increase in skewness after
that process. All these results are also consistent with the new fact.
To conclude, regardless of which indicator is examined as a measure of ﬁnancial development
– standard such as credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP and enforcement of
contracts, or more speciﬁc measures of ﬁnancial frictions, both across countries or over time,
such as bankruptcy costs, monitoring costs, health or sophistication of ﬁnancial markets, the
historical evolution of technology for all countries, or ﬁnancial liberalization processes – the
indicator supports the documented relationship between the degree of asymmetry of move-
ments in real lending rates and the degree of ﬁnancial development.
3 The Model
My empirical analysis has generated a new fact. But it has also strongly suggested an expla-
nation for that fact. The speciﬁc measures of ﬁnancial development, which capture ﬁnancial
frictions through bankruptcy and monitoring costs, seem particularly relevant in explaining
differences of lending rates asymmetry across countries. Therefore, I here provide a model
11The main ﬁnancial liberalization event is deﬁned as occurring in the month in which the maximum number of
liberalization changes have been introduced into the ﬁnancial system. I do not report results for Chile, Indonesia,
and Thailand because their ﬁnancial systems experienced both liberalization and restriction processes during the
sample period 1973-2005.
12The ﬁnancial liberalization process is deﬁned as the time frame between the ﬁrst liberalization change and the
last one during the sample 1973-2005. A ﬁnancial restriction process is identically deﬁned. Since Chile, Indonesia,
and Thailand experienced both liberalization and restriction processes, I can here analyze their experiences.
9Table5: AsymmetryofLendingRatesbeforeandaftertheMainFinancialLiberalizationEvent
Country Main Financial Type of Skewness
Liberalization Event Liberalization Before After
Month Year
Canada March 1975 KA 0.88 0.41
Finland January 1990 SM and DFS 0.43 0.13
France January 1985 DFS and KA 3.94 0.05
Ireland January 1992 SM and DFS 0.57 0.95
Italy January 1992 KA 0.63 0.60
Japan January 1985 SM 1.95 -0.30
Korea January 1999 SM -0.10 -0.27
Philippines January 1994 KA and SM 0.37 0.17
Portugal January 1986 SM 4.05 -0.33
Spain December 1992 KA 2.09 0.48
Sweden January 1984 KA 3.48 0.02
UK October 1973 KA 3.91 1.49
Venezuela April 1996 SM 3.75 0.32
Notes: KA stands for Capital Account, SM stands for Stock Market, and DFS stands for Domestic Financial
System. Data on liberalization dates are from Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008).
Table 6: Asymmetry of Lending Rates before and after a Financial Liberalization Process
Country Start of Financial End of Financial Skewness
Liberalization Process Liberalization Process Before After
Month Year Month Year
Canada March 1975 March 1975 0.88 0.41
Chile January 1984 September 1998 1.17 -0.15
Finland January 1986 January 1990 1.83 0.13
France January 1985 January 1990 3.94 0.08
Indonesia January 1983 August 1989 1.38 0.95
Ireland May 1985 January 1992 1.82 0.95
Italy May 1987 January 1992 1.42 0.60
Japan January 1979 December 1991 1.64 -1.39
Korea January 1988 January 1999 -0.58 -0.27
Philippines January 1976 January 1994 8.04 0.17
Portugal January 1976 August 1992 4.60 -0.09
Spain January 1981 December 1992 2.22 0.48
Sweden January 1978 January 1989 3.76 0.68
Thailand January 1979 June 1992 1.81 0.13
UK October 1973 January 1981 3.91 2.00
Venezuela April 1996 April 1996 3.75 0.32
Note: Data on liberalization dates are from Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008).
10Table 7: Asymmetry of Lending Rates before and after a Financial Restriction Process
Country Start of Financial End of Financial Skewness
Restriction Process Restriction Process Before After
Month Year Month Year
Chile June 1979 January 1983 0.66 1.17
Indonesia March 1991 March 1991 0.95 5.32
Thailand August 1995 May 1997 0.13 0.81
Note: Data on restriction dates are from Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008).
in order to be able to theoretically and quantitatively test these frictions as an explanation for
the new fact.
3.1 An Overview
The model I use is a modiﬁed version of Veldkamp’s (2005) endogenous information model,
in which I include ﬁnancial frictions, more speciﬁcally monitoring and bankruptcy costs. I
show these frictions restrict the ﬂow of information about the state of the economy more after
crises than before crises, hence delaying recoveries and magnifying crises. Here I summarize
the main features of both models.
In the frictionless Veldkamp’s (2005) model, entrepreneurs should borrow to invest in a risky
venture. Lending rates are based on lenders’ inferences about an unobserved state of the
economy that drives failure probabilities (a good state is one with low failure probability,
and hence low default probability). This inference is constructed using signals from previ-
ous ventures’ results, all of which are perfectly observed. When lenders think the state of
the economy is good, lending rates are low and there is a large number of ventures in the
economy, which generates a large number of signals about that state. When the state changes
to bad, all those signals allow lenders to easily recognize that conditions have changed, so
lending rates rise quickly and sharply to account for the higher failure probability. When the
state is bad and changes to good, however, the limited number of existing ventures generates
few signals about the change, so lenders learn about it slowly, and lending rates drop slowly
and gradually.
Into this setup, I introduce an informational friction – an asymmetric amount of information
between borrowers and lenders – so that the observation of the signals to infer the state of
the economy is no longer costless to lenders. To motivate truth-telling by borrowers, lenders
shouldsometimesspendtomonitorthesuccessofventuresbytakingdefaultingonestobank-
ruptcy. Hence monitoring and bankruptcy costs are a representation of the frictions.
11Monitoring and bankruptcy costs have two effects. One is to lower the number of signals
available in the economy, since with higher lender costs come higher lending rates and less
economic activity. That effect is not symmetric across economic states. In times with a high
probability of venture failure, monitoring and bankruptcy are more common and the costs
induce an increase in rates and restrictions on loans, slowing the creation of new economic
activity and so reducing the number of signals available to lenders. Contrarily, when the
probability of failure is low these costs are irrelevant to the level of economic activity. Mon-
itoring and bankruptcy costs thus slow the learning that fuels recoveries from crises but not
the information that sustains crises. The other effect of monitoring and bankruptcy costs is to
increase jumps in lending rates when failure rates increase, which magniﬁes crises. Together,
these two effects result in quicker, sharper rises and slower, more gradual falls in lending
rates, hence more asymmetry in their movements in countries with larger frictions.
3.2 Formal Description
My model, like Veldkamp’s (2005), has a credit market with a ﬁnite number N of risk-neutral
entrepreneurs without funds on their own and M perfectly competitive and risk-neutral in-
vestors, each which has one indivisible unit of capital, where N < M. As in Veldkamp’s
model, some of these entrepreneurs borrow to start a venture, hence some of the investors are
lenders. Unlike Veldkamp’s model, my model has asymmetric information between borrow-
ers and lenders.
In each period t, each entrepreneur i observes a business opportunity that pays vit (drawn
from a support (v;v)) in case of success13 and zero otherwise. All ventures require the same
initial investment (normalized to 1). If entrepreneurs decide to undertake the venture, they
must borrow the money. If they decide not to borrow, their only option is to work for an
exogenously ﬁxed wage w. Investors can either lend the indivisible unit of capital to entre-
preneurs or invest it in a riskless bond that pays an exogenous and constant rate 1 + r.
In this economy, the probability of success is the same for all ventures in period t, θg in good
times (G) and θb in bad times (B), where θg > θb and G and B are the only two possible states
of an aggregate variable that follows a Markov process with persistence 1 − λ. I assume that
neither borrowers nor lenders can observe the state of the economy when negotiating a loan,
but both try to infer it from observations of venture realizations in the previous period.
More explicitly, the expected probability of success of a venture in period t + 1 is determined
in the following way. From the nt funded ventures in period t, agents observe a number of
successes (st) and form posterior beliefs µP
t , using Bayes’ rule and a prior µt = Pr(G)t:14





n−s = n!/[(n − s)!s!] and then C
n
s drops from the equation.
12µP
t = Pr(G|st)t =
θst
g (1 − θg)nt−stµt
θst
g (1 − θg)nt−stµt + θst
b (1 − θb)nt−st(1 − µt)
. (2)
Adjusting these posteriors by the probability of a change in state, the probability of being in
a good state in t + 1 is
µt+1 = Pr(G)t+1 = (1 − λ)µP
t + λ(1 − µP
t ). (3)
And ﬁnally, the expected probability of success of a given venture in t + 1 is
θt+1 = Pr(s)t+1 = µt+1θg + (1 − µt+1)θb. (4)
When the loan is negotiated between an entrepreneur i and an investor j, the venture’s po-
tential payoff vit is observable ex ante by both, but the lender can observe ex post whether the
borrower was successful or not, only at a positive cost c. At the end of the period, borrowers
may pay the stipulated lending rate to lender j, (1+ρjt), or default. Depending on this action,
the lender spends c to monitor the result or not, following the speciﬁcations of the contract by
taking the borrower to bankruptcy. Hence, I assume full commitment.
It is worth highlighting at this point that c represents both the monitoring and bankruptcy
costs required to overcome the ﬁnancial friction of asymmetric information between borrow-
ers and lenders, hence being a measure of the development of the ﬁnancial system in the
economy.
In summary, the timing of the model in each period t is as follows:
• Entrepreneurs and investors agree on their beliefs of being in a good state (µt).
• Investors offer a loan contract, taking into account the monitoring and bankruptcy costs
c. Entrepreneurs decide whether or not to borrow and start a venture given those con-
tracts. Entrepreneurs not borrowing work in a job that pays w. Investors not lending
invest in a riskless bond that pays 1 + r.
• Production occurs. A borrower receives cash ﬂows when its venture is successful.
• Borrowers report the result of their ventures to lenders, and contracts are fulﬁlled. All
reports and monitoring results are publicly observed.
• Beliefs about the probability of being in a good state in the next period (µt+1) are up-
dated. The state changes with a probability λ.
133.3 Equilibrium Outcomes
Here I deﬁne and characterize the equilibrium in this model. Even when we obtain an explicit
analytical solution in each period, it is not possible to express the dynamics of the model
explicitly. However, the nature of the equilibrium allows us to discuss the effects of ﬁnancial
frictions on the asymmetry of movements in lending rates.
Deﬁnition 1 A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), for an initial belief µ0, is given by time
sequences of borrowing (bit) and payment decisions in case of success (zit) by each entrepreneur i,
lending rates (ρijt) and monitoring decisions (γjt) by each investor j, and Bayesian beliefs about the
probability of being in a good state µt, such that the following problems are solved in each period t:
• Each entrepreneur i maximizes expected utility:
max
bit∈{0,1};zit∈[0,1];j∈{1,...,M}
bitθt{zit[vit − (1 + ρijt)] + (1 − zit)(1 − γjt)vit} + (1 − bit)w,
where θt = µtθg + (1 − µt)θb is the expected probability of a successful venture, which depends
on the expected state of the economy.
• Each investor j maximizes expected proﬁts:
max
ρijt∈R,γjt∈{0,1}
ljtθt{zit(1 + ρijt) + (1 − zit)γjt(vit − c)} − ljtγjt(1 − θt)c + (1 − ljt)(1 + r),
where ljt = 1 if some borrower decides to take a loan from this investor in period t.15
• Beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule, following equations (2), (3), and (4), where the total num-
ber of ventures funded is nt =
PN
i=1 bit.
The following proposition characterizes the unique SPNE with nonstochastic monitoring,
which takes the form of an optimal standard debt contract.




θt c to all borrowers i and monitor every default (γjt = 1). All entrepreneurs i borrow
(bit = 1) from any lender j whenever vit ≥ e νt = 1
θt[1 + r + w + (1 − θt)c]. All borrowers report the
truth (zit = 1).
15Recall that I’m not allowing mixing strategies in monitoring decisions (that is, γjt ∈ {0,1} rather than γjt ∈
[0,1]). I focus on nonstochastic monitoring just for expositional reasons, since it is cleaner to highlight the effects of
monitoring costs on asymmetry. In Appendix A.4, I describe the optimal equilibrium with stochastic monitoring
and discuss why the results in terms of the asymmetry impact of c are sustained.
14Proof. First I describe the debt contract that investors offer. Then, I discuss entrepreneurs’
actions under this contract.
Step 1: Investor’s choice
As in Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985), here the standard debt contract is opti-
mal under costly state veriﬁcation with nonstochastic monitoring. In my setting, this result
is even more trivial, since the cash ﬂow for successful ventures is known and only the failure
event is unknown. If lenders do not monitor a default, then borrowers always default, in
which case lenders would not lend. Hence, γjt = 1. Since investors are competitive, expected
proﬁts from lending should equalize expected proﬁts from the riskless bond 1 + r,
(1 − θt)(−c) + θt(1 + ρijt) = 1 + r.
Since the expected probability of success is the same for all ventures and the above condition
is independent of the cash ﬂow of a given venture vit, all investors j choose to charge the
same lending rates to all entrepreneurs i (that is, ρijt = ρt for all i and all j).







Step 2: Entrepreneur’s choice
Since lending rates are the same across lenders, borrowers are indifferent about which lender
j they borrow from. Given the previous contract, successful borrowers always prefer to repay
the loan (zit = 1), obtaining νit−(1+ρt) > 0 rather than 0 if defaulting. The only choice left to
obtain in equilibrium is whether entrepreneurs borrow or not (that is, bit ∈ {0,1}). This choice
is given by a cutoff value over vit such that an entrepreneur i borrows in period t whenever
θt[vit − (1 + ρt)] ≥ w. From equation (5) it is clear that bit = 1
vit ≥ e νt =
1
θt
[1 + r + w + (1 − θt)c]. (6)
A key variable is the number of ventures nt funded in the economy since it determines the
number of signals available for agents to update beliefs. In equilibrium this number is given






15where 1 is an indicator function that adopts the number 1 when the condition in brackets
(equation 6) is fulﬁlled and 0 otherwise.
The number of ventures depends positively on the probability of success θt in two ways: a
higher θt increases expected proﬁts; and a higher θt decreases market lending rates ρ, directly
by decreasing the probability of default and indirectly by reducing expected monitoring costs.
Formally, ∂e νt
∂θt = −(1 + r + w + c)/θ2
t < 0.16 More interestingly, since θt increases with the
probability of being in a good state µt,
∂e νt
∂µt
= −(θg − θb)
[1 + r + w + c]
(µtθg + (1 − µt)θb)2 < 0.
This is important for the determination of signals in the economy. The greater the value for µt,
the greater is θt, the lower the borrowing cutoff value e νt and the more the number of funded
ventures.
At this point, I need to analyze more speciﬁcally my addition of monitoring and bankruptcy
costs c into Veldkamp’s (2005) model. I here note three effects. First, when it is costless for
lenders to monitor ventures’ results (c = 0), this solution coincides with Veldkamp’s original
one. Second, when monitoring costs c are positive, they increase lending rate levels and










Third, this reduction in ventures is not constant across states, since θt affects lending rates
non-linearly. As θt varies, c is scaled by a double effect in the numerator (1 − θt) and the
denominator (θt).
Figure1showsthemodel’srelationbetweenlendingrates(1+ρt)andtheexpectedprobability
of success (θt) for a given level of monitoring and bankruptcy costs c. When the market
believes the probability of success is very high, lenders assign a low probability of having
to spend on bankruptcy at the end of the period, then monitoring and bankruptcy costs do
not impose serious restrictions on lending rates and signals. Contrarily, when the market
believes the probability of success is low, lenders assign a high probability to having to spend
on monitoring and bankruptcy at the end of the period, and these costs have a large role in
the determination of lending rates and the number of signals.
Since the number of signals is changing continuously, writing an explicit analytical solution
of the dynamic evolution of lending rates is intractable. This dynamic behavior is discussed
later by using Monte Carlo simulations.
16A smaller e νt strictly implies higher nt whenever the density function has mass at all points vi ∈ (v;v).
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3.4 Asymmetry Implications
Despite the intractability of the model’s dynamic solution, I can discuss analytically what is of
primary interest here: the model’s implications for asymmetry in lending rates movements.
I demonstrate that the ﬁnancial frictions I have introduced impede the ﬂow of information
more after crises than before them, increasing the asymmetry in lending rates movements
and implying the new fact.
The following proposition shows that monitoring and bankruptcy costs increase the uncon-
ditional skewness on the distribution of lending rate changes. The ﬁrst part of the proof
sketches out why endogenous information generates asymmetry in the ﬁrst place, by mak-
ing lending rates time-irreversible. I just add this part for self-containment reasons, an input
to understand the effects of ﬁnancial frictions on asymmetry. Veldkamp (2005) contains the
full-ﬂedged formal proof of lending rates time-irreversibility in a frictionless framework.
Proposition 3 In an endogenous information economy, monitoring and bankruptcy costs increase the
asymmetry of movements in lending rates measured by their unconditional skewness.
Proof. The proof proceeds in three steps. First, I introduce the concept of time-reversibility
andexplainthesymmetricnatureoflendingratesinaconstantinformationeconomy. Second,
I sketch out why lending rates are time-irreversible and asymmetric in an endogenous infor-
mation economy. Finally, I show that monitoring and bankruptcy costs increase the asymme-
try of movements in lending rates.
17Step 1: Time-reversibility in a constant information economy
Time-reversibility is deﬁned as the property of a stochastic process in which it is not possi-
ble to determine, given the states at a number of points in time after running the stochastic
process, which states came ﬁrst and which states arrived later. In our case beliefs of being
in good times are time reversible if their increase when all signals are positive has the same
magnitude as their decrease when all signals are negative. Assume that the prior of a good
state is µt = x. If all nt ventures fail (st = 0), then µt+1 = y < x. If in the next period all nt+1
ventures succeed (st+1 = nt+1) and the process is time-reversible, then µt+2 = z = x and it is
not possible to tell the order of successes and failures.
In a constant information economy, the number of signals n is given exogenously. Without
loss of generality, assume the economy has equally informative signals (θ = θg = 1 − θb > 1
2)
and no state change (λ = 0).17 If initial beliefs in period t are µt = x and all n signals fail
(s = 0), then from equations (2) and (3) we know that
µt+1 = y =
(1 − θ)nx
(1 − θ)nx + θn(1 − x)
. (9)
If in the next period t + 1 all n signals are successful (s = n), then
µt+2 = z =
θny
θny + (1 − θ)n(1 − y)
. (10)
Replacing (9) with (10), gives µt+2 = z = x. Hence, in a constant information economy, beliefs
follow a time-reversible stochastic process.
Step 2: Time-irreversibility in an endogenous information economy
Inanendogenousinformationeconomy, thenumberofsignalsdependsonthebeliefsofbeing
in a good state. A higher probability of being in good times µt represents a lower cutoff e νt
and more signals nt. In this framework, beliefs are no longer time-reversible. Assume that in
period t, µt = x and all nx
t signals fail (st = 0). The subscript t is now necessary because n
varies with time and the superscript x because nt depends on beliefs µt = x. Then




t x + θnx
t (1 − x)
. (11)
Now, given that y < x, agents are less conﬁdent about being in good times, which reduces
the number of ventures, n
y
t+1 < nx
t . Assume that in the following period, all n
y
t+1 signals are
17As shown by Veldkamp (2005), the logic of the proof extends to not equally informative signals and λ > 0.
18successful18 (st+1 = n
y
t+1). Then










Now replacing (11) with (12) gives that























and we can compute






























t . This means that
the greatest possible decrease in beliefs (from x to y) is more likely than an increase of the
same magnitude (since beliefs just go from y to z). Given equation (5), the greatest possible
increase in lending rates is more likely than a decrease of the same magnitude, which is a nec-
essary and sufﬁcient condition for the existence of positive unconditional asymmetry in lend-
ing rates. Hence, in an endogenous information economy, beliefs follow a time-irreversible
stochastic process that translates into a positive asymmetry in lending rates changes.
Step 3: The effect of monitoring and bankruptcy costs on asymmetry
First, for a country with a given c, we take the difference between the maximum possible
increase in lending rates and the maximum possible decrease in lending rates. These two
numbers are the extremes of the two tails in the distribution of lending rates changes. The
larger the difference between them, the larger the average unconditional skewness of the
distribution. Then we compare this difference across countries with different levels of c.
Changes in lending rates are proportional to changes in beliefs θt, which are proportional
to the number of signals or the cutoffs e ν(θt). Hence the difference between the maximum
possible increase and the maximum possible decrease in lending rates is proportional to
e ν(θb) − e ν(θg). A large difference means that the number of ventures when lenders are pes-
simistic (at θb) is much lower than the number of ventures when lenders are optimistic (at θg),
and hence that the maximum possible decrease in lending rates (from θb) is much lower than
the maximum possible increase in lending rates (from θg).
18The same conclusion is obtained when reversing the order of successes and failures.
19Computing the difference in cutoffs,
e ν(θb) − e ν(θg) =
(θg − θb)
θgθb
[1 + r + w + c] > 0. (14)
Taking derivatives with respect to c






it can be seen that the difference between the maximum possible increase and decrease of
lending rates raises with monitoring costs c hence higher c increases the unconditional lend-
ing rates skewness in average. Also, the impact of monitoring costs is bigger as θb goes to
zero.
Finally, recall that, conditional on a reduction of beliefs of a given magnitude, two countries
























This magniﬁcation effect of c on the rise in lending rates increases also the conditional skew-
ness of changes in lending rates.
My proof of Proposition 3 shows that countries with higher monitoring and bankruptcy costs
experience larger increases and slower decreases of lending rates. This translates into the new
fact: a greater asymmetry of movements in lending rates for countries with greater frictions,
or less-developed ﬁnancial systems.
The intuition for this result is captured by Figure 2, which compares Figure 1 for two coun-
tries with different monitoring and bankruptcy costs. The ﬁrst panel of Figure 2 shows the
crisis magniﬁcation force of monitoring costs. A given decrease in the expected probability of
venture success generates a greater jump of lending rates in countries with higher monitoring
costs. The second panel of Figure 2 shows the recovery delaying force of monitoring costs.
The gap between lending rates in countries with different monitoring costs widens as the ex-
pected probability of venture success decreases. This implies that the speed of recoveries after
20bad times differs between the two countries more than the speed of crises after good times.
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Now I perform some quantitative tests of my model. First, I calibrate the model and, by sim-
ulating it, I show that for reasonable levels of monitoring and bankruptcy costs, it predicts
the differences of skewness observed across countries. Second, I show that one of the model’s
main predictions – countries with less-developed ﬁnancial systems have higher levels of lend-
ing spreads – is both qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the data. Finally, using
data from the United States, I test the plausibility of endogenous information to explain asym-
metry of lending rates and its potential effects on inefﬁciency.
4.1 Simulations
Now I use the model to test quantitatively my explanation for the new fact. A calibrated
version of the model shows that plausible differences of monitoring and bankruptcy costs
across countries can explain their differences in asymmetry of movements in lending rates.
a. The Parameters
Tocalibratemyendogenousinformationmodel, IusetheparametervaluesusedbyVeldkamp
(2005): θg = 0.97, θb = 0.95, λ = 0.027, r = 0.0042, w = 1 and N = 25.
21The probabilities of a venture’s success (θg and θb) are calibrated using bond default rates
listed by Moody’s for 1970 - 2000. Main results use the probabilities of success of U.S. specu-
lative grade bonds, which are riskier than typical U.S. corporate bonds since information on
default rates of emerging market bonds is unavailable.19 The probability of a state transition
λ is obtained using world GDP from the Penn World Tables. The largest potential number of
independent observable signals N, was cleverly obtained by Veldkamp (2005) by measuring
the speed of price adjustments in the United States.20 I assume venture proﬁts are distributed
uniformly in [v,v], where v = 1+w+r
θ and v = 1+w+r
θ , with θ the most optimistic probability
of success and θ the most pessimistic one.21 Finally, parameters r and w only affect the scale
of the lending rate, and skewness is invariant in scale.22 Although I use the same parameters
to represent a whole array of countries, I will argue later that this is in fact a conservative
exercise.
Using these parameters, I simulate lending rates for 1,000 periods and compute the uncondi-
tional skewness of their log changes. I repeat this simulation 10,000 times, obtaining Monte-
carlo standard deviations.
b. Asymmetry Implications
Now I display the relationship between ﬁnancial frictions (measured by monitoring and
bankruptcy costs, c) and the asymmetry of movements in lending rates that the calibrated
model delivers.
Figure 3 shows skewness from the simulations and two standard deviations bounds for each
level of monitoring costs. Since I assume that the initial investment for each venture is 1, a
monitoring cost of, for example c = 0.3, represents a cost of 30% of the initial investment.
As I have formally shown, monitoring costs increase the unconditional skewness of changes
in lending rates. Furthermore, Monte Carlo standard errors show that differences in asym-
metry caused by different monitoring costs are statistically signiﬁcant at standard conﬁdence
levels.23
The result with complete information (c = 0 and skewness around 1.60) is consistent with
19For developed countries, I perform the exercise using information on ”all corporate” bonds (θb = 0.97 and
θg = 0.98). Results are very similar.
20This parameter is very important, since it determines the speed at which the economy learns about the ag-
gregate state. When N goes to inﬁnity, the economy learns immediately about the true state; hence, asymmetry is
nonexistent. Since my main goal is to match differences across countries, an alternative way to calibrate N is to
match the skewness of developed countries (1.51) and use it for the rest of the countries. This alternative N is just
a little higher than Veldkamp’s (N=31), and results are almost identical.
21Results assuming a normal distribution with 95% in [v,v] delivers similar results.
22Skewness is independent of r and w because the support for the distribution of vi is [v,v].
23Even when the simulation results displayed here are based on pure monitoring strategies (consistent with the
theoretical section), very similar results are obtained using the equilibrium based on random monitoring.
22Figure 3: Model’s Simulated Lending Rate Skewness at Different Monitoring Costs




































Veldkamp (2005) with uniformly distributed investment payoffs. This is an important bench-
mark to test the relevance of my explanation. For example, the skewness of 3.33 that devel-
oping countries show on average (income group 4 in Table 2) can be obtained at c = 0 only if
developing countries would be characterized by the following unrealistic conditions:
• Very stable states, λ = 0.0002 (states change each 417 years).
• Very persistent bad times. If Pr(B|G) = λ = 0.027, then Pr(B|B) = 0.998 (bad states
last 50 years in average).
• Clearer and extreme signals: If θg = 0.97, then θb = 0.82 (in bad times 18% of ﬁrms
default). If θb = 0.95, then θg = 0.995 (in good times the probability of default is almost
0, much less than in developed countries).
These are similar conditions Veldkamp (2005) identiﬁes to match a skewness of 2.9 in 13
emerging countries she studies. In our case a skewness of 2.9 is consistent with bankruptcy
costs of around 35% of initial investment, without the need to make dramatic changes to the
calibrated parameters.
Now we can use the model to determine the magnitude of monitoring and bankruptcy costs
that is consistent with the empirical skewness documented earlier (ﬁrst column of Table 8)
and to check if these numbers are plausible. The third column of Table 8 shows the model’s
23Table 8: Implied Monitoring Costs to Match Data on Lending Rate Asymmetry
Country Classiﬁcation Data Djankov et al. (2008) Model’s c
Skewness Bankruptcy Costs Range (in %)
Income group 1 (richest) 1.54 7.2 0 − 4
Income group 2 1.72 15.8 5 − 15
Income group 3 2.08 16.6 18 − 24
Income group 4 (poorest) 3.33 24.4 38 − 42
OECD 1.75 8.8 5 − 15
Non-OECD 2.46 19.2 26 − 32
High contract enforcement 1.36 10.9 0
Low contract enforcement 2.92 23.3 33 − 37
Private bureau 1.40 11.5 0 − 1
No private bureau 2.66 21.1 29 − 35
Notes: Country classiﬁcation and data skewness columns are the ﬁrst and fourth columns of Table 2. Bank-
ruptcy costs are from Djankov et al. (2008). Consistent c refers to monitoring costs that, given the parameters,
allow us to match the skewness observed in data. The range is determined by two Monte Carlo standard devia-
tions at each side of the point estimation.
range of monitoring and bankruptcy costs (based on two Monte Carlo standard deviations)
that is consistent with skewness in each group.
In order to evaluate these numbers, I compare the costs implied by the model with the sub-
jective measure of monitoring and bankruptcy costs offered by Djankov et al. (2008) (second
column of Table 8). Even when the costs our model needs to explain the empirical differences
of skewness are less concentrated than Djankov et al.’s estimated costs (in particular lower for
developed and higher for developing countries), they are in line with those numbers. Hence,
my model is also quantitatively consistent with the new fact.
c. The Dynamic Nature of the Results
Finally, to illustrate the nature of the results, Figure 4 shows an example of the model’s view
of lending rate dynamics under the same shock realizations but with different levels of mon-
itoring costs–which, again, represent different levels of ﬁnancial frictions or development of
the ﬁnancial system. More precisely, Figure 4 displays the paths of lending rates over 100
simulated periods (out of 1,000 periods) of 1 simulation (out of 10,000 simulations) for three
economies with different levels of monitoring costs, c = 0, c = 0.25, and c = 0.5.
This ﬁgure displays three clear relationships:
• Lending rates are higher in economies with higher monitoring and bankruptcy costs.
• When the economy moves from good times (G) to bad times (B), lending rates jump
more in the countries with high costs than in the country without costs.
24Figure 4: Model’s Evolution of Lending Rates with Different Levels of Monitoring Costs
























• When the economy moves from bad times (B) to good times (G), lending rates decline
everywhere, but they are faster in the country without costs than in the countries with
high costs.
Overall, then, this ﬁgure illustrates that higher monitoring costs (more relevant frictions) gen-
erate higher levels of lending rates, magnify crises, and delay the generation of signals that
fuel recoveries. This is why the model produces a positive relationship between the asymme-
try of movements in lending rates and monitoring and bankruptcy costs. Here, I have shown
this relationship is not only qualitatively but also quantitatively correct.
4.2 Testable Predictions about Levels of Lending Spreads
The model generates testable predictions in terms of the level of lending spreads, measured as
the differencebetween lendingrates andrisk-free interestrates: countries with less developed
ﬁnancial systems have, on average, higher lending spreads.
First, it is useful to decompose lending rates in the model (equation 5) in three terms: a risk-
free rate, a risk premium (which depends on the risk-free rate adjusted by default proba-
bilities), and expected monitoring and bankruptcy costs to solve the frictions imposed by
asymmetric information, such that
ρt = r +
(1 − θt)
θt






∂c = (1−θt)/θt > 0, spreads ρt −r increase with monitoring and bankruptcy costs.
Here we show not only this is the case empirically but also that the calibrated version of the
model can explain quantitatively spread differences across countries.
a. Monitoring Costs Increase Lending Spreads
We construct lending spreads by taking the monthly difference between real lending rates
and 3-month Treasury bill yields for each country.24 We then take the average spread for each
country in the sample period 1960-2005.
Table 9 shows the results of running regressions between average levels of lending spreads
and our general and speciﬁc measures of ﬁnancial development. All coefﬁcients have the ex-
pected sign and are statistically signiﬁcant. An important drawback is that, unlike regressions
to explain skewness, level comparison may be capturing important differences in methodolo-
gies and deﬁnitions across countries. Even when we have to be more careful in interpreting
these regressions, results are robust to many sample restrictions and seem consistent with the
prediction that monitoring and bankruptcy costs increase lending spreads.
b. Monitoring Costs Are Quantitatively Important
Here I show differences in monitoring costs are also quantitatively important to explain dif-
ferences of lending spreads across countries.
TheﬁrstcolumnofTable10showstheaveragereallendingratesforthecountryclassiﬁcations
deﬁned earlier and the second column shows average lending spreads. While real lending
rates among the poorest countries are roughly double than those among the richest countries,
spreads more than double. In the third column I show simulated spreads from the calibrated
version of the model. In the fourth and ﬁfth columns I decompose spreads between risk
premium (by using average 3-month Treasury bill yields for each country in the sample to
calibrate risk-free rates) and ﬁnancial frictions costs (by using the estimated monitoring and
bankruptcy costs from the last column in Table 8).
Two conclusions can be drawn from Table 10. First, comparing data and simulated spreads
(columns 2 and 3), the model matches spreads observed in developed countries and under-
estimates spreads in less developed countries. However, the differences are important, with
spreads in poorest countries doubling those in richest countries. Second, as shown in the
last column, monitoring costs account for more than 25% of spreads in developing countries
(income group 4) and less than 2% in developed ones (income group 1).25
24The information on 3-month Treasury bill yields was obtained from the Global Financial Database (GFD)
(2008). We have monthly data for 63 countries from 1960 to 2005.
25I have not found evidence of large cross-country differences in the volatility of log changes in lending rates.
This is also consistent with the model, as shown in Appendix A.2.
26Table 9: Lending Rate Spreads and Financial Development
Dependent Variable 1985 – 2008
Lending Rate Spreads
Credit to Private Sector/GDP -0.04
(All countries) (0.01)∗∗∗
Credit to Private Sector/GDP -0.04
(Non-African countries) (0.01)∗∗∗
Cost of bankruptcy 0.15
(0.04)∗∗∗




Constant 7.16 6.87 2.82 3.66 7.68
(0.88)∗∗∗ (1.14)∗∗∗ (0.60)∗∗∗ (0.88)∗∗∗ (1.14)∗∗∗
Observations 63 50 58 58 58
Dependent Variable 1985 – 2008
Lending Rate Spreads
Legal protection to ﬁnancial assets −1.76
(0.55)∗∗∗
Sophistication for ﬁnancial markets −1.41
(0.47)∗∗∗
Availability of Internet banking −1.19
(0.48)∗∗
Health of banking systems −1.16
(0.82)∗∗
Constant 13.75 10.81 9.73 10.59
(3.20)∗∗∗ (2.44)∗∗∗ (2.46)∗∗∗ (2.83)∗∗∗
Observations 43 43 43 43
Notes: * Signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, and *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses.
27Table 10: Data vs. Model Spreads of Lending Rates
Country Classiﬁcation Data Model





θ c c explains
Income group 1 (richest) 12.5 2.9 2.9 2.8 0.1 1.8
Income group 2 19.2 4.1 3.2 3.0 0.3 8.0
Income group 3 17.7 6.0 5.5 4.7 0.9 15.2
Income group 4 (poorest) 20.3 7.9 6.4 4.7 1.7 26.2
OECD 11.9 2.9 3.1 2.8 0.3 8.4
Non-OECD 20.2 6.3 6.0 4.7 1.2 20.3
High contract enforcement 14.9 3.2 2.9 2.9 0.0 0.0
Low contract enforcement 18.4 6.0 6.1 4.7 1.5 23.7
Private bureau 16.4 3.8 2.9 2.9 0.0 0.4
No private bureau 19.7 6.9 6.0 4.7 1.3 22.1
4.3 Evidence of Endogenous Learning Mechanism in the United States
In this subsection I tackle two questions related to our model.
First, is the asymmetry of lending rates just a reﬂection of asymmetry in fundamentals, in par-
ticular asymmetry in default probabilities? I show that in the United States changes in default
probabilities are negatively, not positively, skewed. If lenders were learning fast about these
probabilities, lending rates would follow them closer. One possibility for this inconsistency
is that, as proposed in the paper, there are frictions for lenders to learn about real default
probabilities.
Second, if learning is the right story, do the number of signals in the economy and the un-
certainty recover slowly after a sudden decrease? We show that investment in the United
States is negatively skewed (it decreases fast and recovers slowly) and uncertainty is posi-
tively skewed (it increases fast and recovers slowly), which is consistent with the mechanism
proposed here.
The variables I use to answer these questions are as follows:
• Default probabilities: Moody’s monthly trailing 12-month issuer default rate for all
rated corporate bonds. Sample: 1970-2008.
• Uncertainty: Quarterly uncertainty index from Bloom, Floetotto, and Jaimovich (2009).
This index combines spreads in the growth of ﬁrm sales and output, in ﬁrm stock re-
turns, in forecaster predicted unemployment and industrial production, and volatilities
28in macro output growth and stock returns. Sample: 1962-I:2008-II. 26
• Investment: Quarterly data of net borrowing from corporate business from the Flow of
Funds Accounts of the United States published by the Federal Reserve Board. Sample:
1962-I:2008-II
As shown in Appendix A.1, log changes of real lending rates in the United States are posi-
tively skewed (0.31).27 Log changes of corporate default rates are negatively skewed (-1.72).
Log changes of uncertainty are positively skewed (0.83),28 and log changes of investment are
negatively skewed (-0.95).
All these results are consistent with the model. After a sudden increase in lending rates,
investment declines and takes time for it to recover (negative skewness), making the uncer-
tainty in the economy and hence lending rates to decline slowly (positive skewness). Since
this asymmetric pattern of movements in lending rates does not reﬂect the evolution of real
default probabilities (which are negative skewed) it generates an inefﬁcient reallocation of re-
sources out of productive activities during periods of time where default probabilities are in
fact low, but lenders are not yet convinced and charge high rates.
5 Conclusions
A well-documented feature of lending rates is the asymmetry of their changes. In general,
upturns are sudden and sharp, while downturns are slow and gradual. This is a non-trivial
fact; the asymmetry may generate ﬁnancial distresses and may eventually also affect the real
economy by, for example, causing a costly reallocation of resources. Here I have documented
a new, related fact: the well-known asymmetry is stronger the less developed the ﬁnancial
system of a country is.
My explanation for that fact relies on the greater amount of frictions, in particular monitoring
and bankruptcy costs, in the ﬁnancial systems of developing countries. I build this explana-
tion into an endogenous model of information. The frictions not only magnify crises but also
26I do not include information after 2008-II, since it would capture a big uncertainty jump that would bias the
skewness computations positively since the corresponding recovery has not yet been realized.
27This number is based on data from the IFS, which only has information on mortgage rates and prime rates
for the United States. Since mortgage rates, which better represent the ﬁnancial needs of the private sector, are
only available from April 1971, we used prime rates for the sixties. An alternative series of real lending rates for
the United States is constructed by Neely and Rapach (2008) with quarterly data from the Federal Reserve System
from 1953 to 2007. Log changes in their real lending rate series have a skewness of 0.6.
28Alternatively I used the VIX Index from the CBOE, that uses option prices to determine the uncertainty in
stock markets. The skewness of log changes is also positive (0.7).
29restrict the generation of information after crises and so lead to slower, more gradual recov-
eries in countries with less-developed ﬁnancial systems. Simulations and other quantitative
tests of the model are consistent with my explanation.
Here I have added elements to understand the effects of ﬁnancial frictions beyond the well-
documented ﬁrst-order effects of raising the cost of capital and decreasing the level of invest-
ment. I have shown that ﬁnancial frictions also magnify crises and slow down recoveries gen-
erating potentially large inefﬁciencies in the reallocation of resources over the business cycle.
Hence, this paper provides an additional reason to reduce monitoring and bankruptcy costs
in ﬁnancial systems and an additional source of gains from ﬁnancial liberalization processes.
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32A Appendix
A.1 Sample of Countries
All 100 countries in the sample, based on income classiﬁcation, are shown in Table 11. Re-
ported skewness corresponds to the period 1960 - 2008.
Table 11: Countries Included in Classiﬁcation by Income
Singapore -0.64 Italy 0.59 Norway 1.79
Hong Kong -0.22 Japan 0.60 Portugal 2.11
Macao -0.21 Slovenia 0.60 Sweden 2.99
Israel -0.07 Ireland 0.76 Korea 3.47
Switzerland -0.04 Spain 0.77 France 4.30
Belgium 0.12 Netherlands 0.78 Greece 4.51
United States 0.31 Iceland 1.20 Kuwait 5.50
Canada 0.43 Germany 1.41 Cyprus 6.82
Finland 0.58 United Kingdom 1.58
Chile -0.50 Hungary 0.85 Brazil 2.92
Estonia -0.36 Romania 1.03 Czech Republic 3.65
Uruguay -0.30 Argentina 1.46 Poland 5.70
Slovak Republic 0.19 Croatia 1.48 Gabon 6.38
Barbados 0.69 Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 1.73
South Africa 0.80 Mexico 1.80
Latvia -0.42 Philippines 0.22 Equatorial Guinea 3.61
Namibia -0.34 Sri Lanka 0.44 Guatemala 3.86
Thailand -0.26 Swaziland 0.45 Botswana 4.54
Russia -0.23 Paraguay 0.75 Indonesia 4.62
Lithuania -0.14 Bolivia 1.14 Cape Verde 6.22
Dominican Republic -0.08 Jordan 1.83 Morocco 8.14
Colombia -0.05 Jamaica 2.01 Guyana 10.25
Grenada 0.10 El Salvador 2.35
Peru 0.20 Egypt 2.82
Angola -0.61 Haiti 1.09 Chad 4.43
Mozambique -0.52 Vietnam 1.95 Lao People's Dem.Rep 4.73
Moldova -0.47 Rwanda 2.17 Congo, Republic of 4.99
Nigeria -0.46 Honduras 2.64 Senegal 5.13
Nicaragua -0.39 India 2.91 Central African Rep. 5.73
Kenya -0.08 Uganda 2.95 Madagascar 8.01
Armenia 0.14 Zambia 3.22 Albania 8.01
Burundi 0.49 Tanzania 3.30 Ethiopia 8.44
Lesotho 0.70 Tunisia 3.49 Bangladesh 8.80
Solomon Islands 1.00 Malawi 3.91 Gambia, The 9.01
Sierra Leone 1.01 Cameroon 4.31 Mauritania 10.16
Income Group 4 (Poorest)
LR Skewness (1960-2008) by Income Classification















33The rest of country classiﬁcations are reported in Table 12.
Table 12: Countries Included in Other Classiﬁcations  
OECD (23 countries)  Non-OECD Countries (77 countries) 
Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States. 
Albania, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Rep., 
Chad, Chile, Hong Kong, Macao, Colombia, Congo, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Dem. Rep., 
Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritania, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia. 
 
High Contract Enforcement (27 countries)  Low Contract Enforcement (28 countries) 
Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, 
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, 
Venezuela. 
 
Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Rep., Chad, Colombia, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia. 
 
Private Bureau (40 countries)  Non-Private Bureau (40 countries) 
Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Hong Kong, Colombia, Czech Republic, El 
Salvador, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, 
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea, 
Kuwait, Mexico, Namibia, Netherlands, Norway, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, United 
States, Uruguay. 
Albania, Angola, Armenia, Bangladesh, Belgium, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Rep., Chad, 
Congo, Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Lao 
People's Dem. Rep., Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Moldova, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Russia, Sierra 
Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia. 
 
 
A.2 Volatility of Lending Rates
Table 13 shows that it is not possible to distinguish a clear difference among countries in terms
of volatility of changes in lending rates, T-bills, or spreads. The model is consistent with
the data, since differences in monitoring costs do not deliver any pattern of cross-country
differences in lending rate volatility. However, the model fails to match the level of volatility.
34Table 13: Data vs. Estimated Volatility in Changes of Lending Rates
Country Volatility (in % - St. Dev.)
Classiﬁcation Data Model
Lending T-Bill Spread Spread
Rates Rates
Income group 1 4.3 12.6 25.8 1.1
Income group 2 9.8 13.8 40.8 1.0
Income group 3 5.4 11.5 32.6 0.9
Income group 4 6.1 13.0 27.4 0.9
OECD 5.0 9.8 32.9 0.9
Non-OECD 6.6 13.9 29.2 0.9
High contract enforcement 5.7 11.2 31.8 0.9
Low contract enforcement 4.7 11.8 26.8 0.8
Private bureau 6.2 12.4 30.7 0.7
No private bureau 6.7 13.5 31.4 0.7
A.3 Robustness on the Skewness Deﬁnition
In the main text, I analyze differences of skewness in log changes of real lending rates across
countries, using several classiﬁcations related to ﬁnancial development. Here, I extend the
analysis using two alternative approaches to measure skewness.
First, I compute skewness in the distribution of log deviations from a real lending rate trend.
For each month, I obtain the difference between the log of real lending rates and the log of the
Hodrick-Prescott trend. Table 14 shows that the results using this approach are very similar
to those in the main text, hence skewness does not seem to depend on differences of the trend
across countries.
Second, the model can be interpreted as a model of skewness in lending spreads rather than
a model of skewness in lending rates, since I do not discuss the determination of risk-free
interest rates. Table 15 shows cross-country differences in skewness of log changes in lending
spreads and log changes in risk-free rates. Differences in lending spread skewness are con-
sistent with those in the main text. Asymmetry seems to be higher among poor, non-OECD
countries with low enforcement of contracts. Furthermore, skewness in lending rates is not
driven by skewness in risk-free interest rates since T-bill rates are more skewed in developed
countries than in developing countries.
An important drawback to use skewness of lending spreads is that the measure of Treasury
bill yields in developing countries is not available on a high-quality basis. Hence, the use of
spreads to compare developed and developing countries is seriously hindered. This is the
main reason I focus directly on analyzing skewness of lending rates in the main text.
35Table 14: Asymmetry on Lending Rates and Financial Development (Using differences in the
log deviation from trend)
Country Classiﬁcation 1960 – 1985 1985 – 2008 1960 – 2008
Income group 1 (richest) 2.55 −0.09 0.85
Income group 2 2.59 1.80 1.90
Income group 3 4.12 1.93 1.92
Income group 4 (poorest) 4.46 2.34 2.63
OECD 2.21 1.34 2.07
Non-OECD 4.08 1.49 1.71
High contract enforcement 1.93 0.68 1.53
Low contract enforcement 3.65 2.11 2.34
Private bureau 1.82 0.87 1.06
No private bureau 4.82 1.86 2.20
Dependent Variable All Countries Non-African Countries
Lending Rate Skewness 1960 – 1985 1985 – 2008 1960 – 1985 1985 – 2008
Credit to private sector / GDP −0.034 −0.019 −0.045 −0.015
(0.014)∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.016)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗
Constant 4.44 2.29 5.23 1.93
(0.68)∗∗∗ (0.41)∗∗∗ (0.91)∗∗∗ (0.50)∗∗∗
Observations 47 94 31 70
Notes: * Signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, and *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. The dependent variable is the skewness measured over the distribution of log changes in monthly
lending rates in deviations from Hodrick-Prescott trend, obtained from the IMF’s IFS database. Yearly data on
credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP are from the World Bank’s WDI database. The simple average
per country over the period sample is considered.
Table 15: Asymmetry on Spreads and Risk-free Interest Rates by Country Classiﬁcation
Country Classiﬁcation Spread Skewness T-Bill Skewness
Income group 1 (richest) −0.03 0.59
Income group 2 −0.22 0.58
Income group 3 0.38 0.69
Income group 4 (poorest) 0.51 −0.36
OECD −0.37 0.68
Non-OECD 0.43 0.21
High contract enforcement −0.19 0.58
Low contract enforcement 0.50 −0.31
Private bureau 0.01 0.56
No private bureau 0.27 −0.01
36A.4 Optimal Equilibrium with Stochastic Monitoring
Proposition 4 In the optimal equilibrium with stochastic monitoring (γt ∈ [0,1]) borrowers never lie
(zit = 1) and monitoring probabilities and lending rates are, for all lenders j at time t
γit =
(






(1 + ρit) =
(
1+r+(1−θt)c






Entrepreneurs i borrow (bit = 1) from any lender j whenever
vit ≥ e νt =




(1 + r + w)2 + (1 − θt)c[2(1 + r − w) + (1 − θt)c]
2θt
(19)
Proof. As in the main text, we assume full commitment, which means the lender commits to
follow the random strategy γit. Note that the standard debt contract, where γit = 1 regardless
of vit, is also an equilibrium. However, when vit is high enough, it is not necessary γit = 1
to achieve truth–telling. A lower monitoring probability reduces lending rates maintaining
incentives to pay back, which is naturally preferred by borrowers. Borrowers tell the truth if
vit − (1 + ρt) > (1 − γt)vit, subject to γit ≤ 1. The solution is γit = min{
(1+ρit)
vit ,1}.
From perfect competition, the previous γit implies that, θt(1 + ρit) − (1 − θt)c
(1+ρit)
vit = 1 + r.
Solving ﬁrst for 1 + ρit and then for γit, gives equations (17) and (18). Given this contract





≥ w. From this equation,
comes the cutoff in equation (19). .
Four features of this equilibrium are worth noting. First, e νt >
1+r+(1−θt)c
θt for all monitoring
costs c ≥ 0. This means that, effectively, borrowers have a level of vit such that monitoring
costs are given by γit = 1+r
θtvit−(1−θt)c, from equation (17), and lending rates are given by (1 +
ρit) =
(1+r)vit
θtvit−(1−θt)c, from equation (18). Second, if c = 0 or θt = 1 the unique equilibrium
is the standard debt contract with non-stochastic monitoring. Third, cutoffs in the optimal
equilibrium are smaller than those under a standard debt contract since lending rates are
lower. Finally, the optimal equilibrium generates the same asymmetry implications as the
standard debt contract. Monitoring costs still magnify crashes (c increases levels of lending
rates), and beliefs still follow a time-irreversible process that delays recoveries. This proof
follows the same logic as the one for Proposition 3.
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